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Abstract
The recent revision (March 2005) of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has
confirmed the 3% deficit/GDP ratio as the pillar of the excessive deficits procedure
envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty for member countries of the EMU. Since the
deficit/GDP ceiling is still in place, research on its implications for fiscal discipline
and macroeconomic stabilization has to be pushed further. We argue that the
agenda largely involves empirical matters. In particular, this paper presents an
econometric estimate and simulations of a macroeconomic model of Italy and
Germany aimed at addressing three issues. First, monetary and fiscal rules
intercations are explictly modelled and examined in dynamic setting. Second,
consistently with common perception and the new formulation of the SGP, the
business cycle and the responses of policy variables are cast in terms of growth
gaps, not gaps in levels, with respect to potential. Third, budgetary components
(primary expenditure and total tax revenue) are examined as separate fiscal rules,
which allows us to track the reaction of the fiscal stance to growth shocks more
precisely, to point out several pitfalls in current measures of fiscal ratios to GDP,
and suggest more accurate assessment of fiscal stances.
JEL Classification: E0; E6
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“[…] since the second half of 2004, growth in the Euro area has been modest,
below the area’s potential growth rate”
                                     Jean-Claude Trichet (May 30th, 2005)
 “[…] the delivery of the new, refocused Lisbon agenda could boost Europe’s
natural rate of growth to around 3 percent per year and bring our goal of full
employment within reach by the end of the decade”
                    José-Manuel Barroso (April 2nd, 2005)
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The recent revision (March 2005) of the Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) has confirmed the 3% deficit/GDP ratio as the pillar of the “excessive
deficits procedure” envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty for member
countries of the EMU. The  many criticisms levelled time and again
precisely against the misconception of the deficit/GDP ceiling as a means to
measure excessive deficits in the Maastricht Treaty’s spirit have only
marked a limited succes in that  some more “flexibility” has been injected
into the procedure, by allowing deduction of a list of long-run growth-
promoting expenses,  a longer time span for correction of excess deficits, and
less stringent definition of “recession” to qualify for exemption from the
excess deficit procedure1.  Since the deficit/GDP ceiling is still in place
research on its implications for fiscal discipline and macroeconomic
stabilization has to be pushed further. We argue that the agenda largely
involves empirical matters. In particular, this paper presents an
econometric exercise aimed at addressing the following issues.
First, analyses and prescriptions concerning fiscal and monetary
policy in a monetary union should be rooted in a fully specified
macroeconomic scenario in which the interactions between the two policies
are clearly understood and identified. Favero (2002) recalls the theoretical
reasons that underpin this claim and shows the empirical mistakes that
may be generated by piece-wise analyses of monetary and fiscal policies.
                                           
1 These new caveats and exemptions add to others, previoulsy introduced − most
notably the introduction of official measures of “recessions” allowing for exemptions
and of “cyclically adjusted” deficit/GDP ratios. See Buti and Sapir (1998),  Galì and
Perotti (2003), Buti and Franco. (2005) for a brief account of these progressive
adjustments.
2Developments in this direction are only recent (e.g. Melitz (2002), Muscatelli
et al. (2004), Farina and Ricciuti (2005)).  By contrast, most of the empirical
work that has been produced so far in support of the SGP approach does not
meet this requirement. This holds true both for works aimed at showing the
tendency of pre-Maastricht European governments towards "fiscal
indiscipline" (see e.g. Buti and Sapir (1998, Ch.VII)), and for research aimed
at showing the adequacy of domestic stabilizers within the SGP limits (see
e.g. Buti et al. (1998), Artis and Buti (2000))2.
Second, it is well-known that the deficit/GDP ratio is a variable highly
sensitive to the business cycle, if anything because both the numerator and
the denominator are cyclical. Nonetheless, most applied research still uses
the deficit/GDP ratio as a single variable.  However, the official methods to
identify the cyclical component of the total budget are far from satisfactory.
As shown by Melitz (2005), the current practice that starts from the total
deficit and proceeds by correcting for selected cyclical stabilizers may miss
the target quite easily. Selection of candidate items based on ex-ante
institutional information (see e.g. Perotti (2002)) soon enters a tangle of
norms and practices wildly different from country to country3. The textbook
antinomy between "cyclical budget/automatic stabilizers" on the one hand,
and "structural budget/discretionary interventions" on the other, is
misleading in practice. Stabilization policy may be realized by means of
discretionary measures, and these measures may also have structural
effects. As a matter of example, think of a cut of distortionary taxes during a
recession (Galì and Perotti, 2003). We argue that new effort is necessary to
trace the cyclical behaviour of deficit/GDP ratio back to its two components,
especially as  “excessive deficits” measures and procedures are to be based
on a clear identification (and delimitation) of governments’ responsibilities.
Moving in this perspective, a third issue at stake is that budget
analysis by components should be pushed further. The decomposition
between primary and total budget is a minimal requirement, since over the
typical time horizon of the business cycle interest payments are largely
predetermined by the stock of outstanding debt and by the effect of
monetary policy on interest rates. Thus, a reasonable approximation to the
                                           
2 Preliminary work that address this issue can be found in Farina and Tamborini
(2002, 2004), Tamborini (2004)
3 And the estimates of “fiscal shocks” obtained by Perotti are by his own admission
not very plausible in several instances.
3actual fiscal stance of the government would at least require a good measure
of the cyclically-adjusted primary budget. To this effect, we should consider
that existing evidence suggests that primary expenditure on the one hand,
and total tax revenue on the other may have different cyclical properties
(e.g. Favero (2002), Galì and Perotti (2003), Melitz (2005)) .
Finally, issues concerning the correct measurement of the cyclical
position of a country and the response of its fiscal variables should be
reconsidered carefully. To some extent this need is recognized in the
reformulation of exemption clauses in the new SGP. Old exemptions of the
3% rule based on the increasing "gravity of recessions" were complex and too
strict. All included negative growth rates of GDP (from less than  −0.75%
(“mild”) to more than − 2% (“exceptional”)). Buti and Sapir (1998) have
detected just 84 observations in this range for all EU countries (5 for Italy, 8
for Germany) from 1961 to 1997. However, the words of the Presidents of
the the European Central Bank and of the European Commission quoted
above4 represent anedoctical evidence supporting what seems to be an
uncontroversial fact. When thinking of macroeconomic performance and
how it can be influenced through policy actions, policymakers think in terms
of differences between actual and potential GDP growth rates (growth gap),
and to them a downturn starts whenever the observed growth rate is
negative relative to the trend (potential) rate even though positive in absolute
terms. Accordingly,
“a breach of the threshold [of 3% deficit] will now be considered exceptional if  it
results from a negative growth rate or an accumulated loss of output during a
protracted period of very low growth relative to potential growth” (Buti and Franco
(2005, p.15), italics added).
Given that the focus of the new normative macroeconomics (Taylor, 1999) on
policy rules is aimed at assessing how policymakers do and should behave in
practice, why is it that the bias of central bankers and prime ministers for
percentage points is seldom considered in theoretical and empirical models?
 The materials that we present in this paper are organized as follows.
In section 2 we introduce a macroeconomic model with monetary and fiscal
                                           
4 Respectively available  at http:/www.bis.org/review/r050602d.pdf and at
http://www.eua.be/eua/jsp/en/upload/Barroso_speech.1112693429657.pdf.
4policy rules suitable to econometric estimation. The model includes
aggregate demand and supply for GDP and the inflation rate, a Taylor rule
for the nominal interest rate and two fiscal rules for primary expenditure
and total tax revenue. Two features are noteworthy.  The first is that the
model is specified so as to capture cycles in terms of gaps in growth rates
rather than in levels of GDP. Consequently we have a system of linear
dynamic equations whereby we can study the evolution of the endogenous
variables over the cycle in terms of rates of deviation from their balanced or
target growth paths. The second feature is that the monetary and fiscal
rules are interdependent. Section 3 reports on the econometric results for
Italy and Germany with yearly data from 1962 to 2004. We have chosen
these two countries not only because they are major euro-economies, but
especially because they differ markedly as to their monetary and fiscal
history. Hence we expected that their comparison might deliver rich
information on the issue of fiscal-monetary interactions, and econometric
results do lend support to this presumption.  Section 4 presents simulations
of a temporary negative shock to the GDP growth rate in the two economies
based on the respective estimated models. Simulations concern the five
endogenous variables as well as two additional variables derived from the
previous ones, namely the primary and the total budget. As explained
above, the system yields the sequence of variations of the variables until a
new steady-state is reached and conveys information on the different
dynamics of the various budget components over the cycle. From these
simulated data, we can also examine the evolution of the deficit/GDP ratio
sheding light on the much debated question of the actual control of
governments on its cyclical behaviour. Section 5 presents some concluding
remarks.
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Our analysis is based on a theoretical framework rooted in the New
Keynesian approach, whose main target is to determine output, temporary
rigid nominal prices and the interest rate exploiting general-equilibrium
interactions in the simplest possible way (Krugman, 2000). Following e.g.
Bean (1998), Cecchetti (2000) and Taylor (2000a), such a model should rest
on three main ingredients: a) an AD curve relating current real spending
5and the real interest rate; b) an AS curve which relates prices and output,
such that the relationship is vertical in the long-run and positively sloped in
the short-run; c) one (or more) policy reaction function(s) (RF), which
illustrates how policymakers react to shocks. This class of models rests on
the existence of a set of mutually consistent values of macro-variables that
define the steady-state general equilibrium of the system where output is at
its potential level. Then, policy analysis is cast in terms of deviations from
the steady state.
2.1 The core model of practical macroeconomics5
In its basic form, the theoretical framework used for empirical policy
analysis has the following typical format6
         (AD): yuzry +γ+β−α=ˆ (1)
   (AS): piφpi uy += ˆˆ (2)
(MRF): iuyri ++++= ˆˆ* δpiεpi (3)
  (FRF): zuyzz +η+= ˆ* (4)
Real variables are defined in logarithm (x = ln(X)), while (^) denotes the
contemporaneous deviation of a variable from its steady-state or its target
value ( xˆ  ≡ x − x*). Equation (1) states that deviations of actual output from
its potential yˆ  depend on the real interest rate r, on a variable measuring
fiscal stance z, and on a real shock uy. The variable z may be a measure of
expenditure, of taxation or of the overall government budget depending on
different specifications and microfoundations of the model. The parameter γ
can be positive or negative depending on the fiscal variable chosen. By
                                           
5 Terminology is due to AEA (1997).
6 A similar framework may be derived from a rigorously microfounded dynamic
general equilibrium model (e.g. McCallum and Nelson (1999) among many others),
where the relations corresponding to our equations (1) and (2) are derived from
households choosing optimal intertemporal paths for their consumption and firms
setting prices optimally according to a Calvo-type mechanism. The main difference
with the specification we employ is that explicit microfoundations allow
expectations on future output and inflation to explicitly appear in the IS and the
Phillips curves, respectively. Useful surveys of the so-called New IS-LM model are
Clarida et al. (1999) and King (2000).
6imposing the steady-state condition yˆ = 0, from (1) we obtain the neutral
real interest rate as:7
  ** zr β
γ
+β
α
= , (5)
that is the real interest rate consistent with output equalling its potential
level at constant inflation. Notice that the neutral interest rate is a function
of the steady-state, or structural, fiscal stance. Making use of (5), and
defining r ≡ r* + rˆ , z ≡ z* + zˆ ,  equation (1) may be rewritten as:
          yuzry +γ+β−= ˆˆˆ . (1-bis)
Equation (2) is a simple AS curve, saying that inflation grows higher
than the official target chosen by the Central Bank ( 0*ˆ >−= pipipi ) as soon
as the output gap and the inflation shock upi are positive. The parameter φ >
0 measures the flexibility of prices: the higher is φ, the faster is the
adjustment of prices towards their market-clearing level. Temporary
deviations of output from its potential imply a positively sloped relation
between inflation and output, while non-zero realizations of the inflation
shock when output is at its potential cause shifts of the inflation rate along
a vertical (long-run) relation. Note that this specification is consistent with
an expectations-augmented AS, where the expected inflation rate is moved
to the left-hand side and is assumed to be equal the central-bank target pi*8.
This implies that inflation is always near its target.
Equation (3) represents a general parameterization of the well-known
Taylor’s rule for monetary policy (Taylor, 1993), with the term ui
representing a monetary shock. The main idea is that the central bank sets
the short-run nominal interest rate (i) in order to target the neutral interest
rate. Deviations of actual inflation from its target level and of the actual
output from its potential are associated with a deviation of the real interest
rate from its neutral level of the same sign. As discussed in Allsopp and
                                           
7 In spite of resembling very closely the Wicksellian notion of natural real rate of
interest, r* is directly influenced by fiscal policy so that the term neutral is more
suitable (Allsopp and Vines, 2000). In fact, standard economic theory implies that
the neutral rate of interest is a function of consumers’ preferences and of the trend
growth rate of output. If an endogenous growth mechanism is added to the model,
fiscal policy may affect the neutral rate of interest even in a Wicksellian world via
its impact on the steady-state growth rate. Note, however, that the channel
involved here is quite different.
8 See Cecchetti (2000).
7Vines (2000), a monetary authority endowed with a rule like (3) can
successfully deal with the two main functions usually assigned to monetary
policy, that is to provide a nominal anchor to the economy and to stabilize
output fluctuations.
Equation (4) is the policy rule of the fiscal authority, and represents a
more recent extension of the framework towards fiscal policy analysis
(Taylor (2000a)). Typically, the fiscal variable is conceived of as sensitive to
the business cycle, so that it remains at its steady-state value z* up to
deviations in output or exogenous fiscal shocks (z* = 0 in case z represents
the overall budget).
2.2 The "growth gaps" model
Among recent studies of monetary-policy interactions in the EMU one
may find Favero (2002) and Melitz (2002) as examples of empirical
structural models, and Muscatelli et al. (2004) as an example of
microfounded structural model, all yielding specifications of the previous
reference framework. The change of perspective in order to account for the
attitude of policy-makers to think in terms of gaps in growth rather than of
gaps in levels may be addressed straightforwardly within that framework.
By construction, the model (1-bis)-(4) is fully consistent with a
balanced-growth solution, such that at every point in time the output level
Yt equals its potential, Y*t, which in turn is assumed to grow over time by
the constant potential growth rate q*, i.e.  Y*t/Y*t-1 = 1 + q*, all t. Hence,
along such a growing path:
• the inflation rate is constant and equal to the target value set by the
central bank, pi*;
• the nominal and real interest rates are constant and fulfill the Fisher
equation, i* = r* + pi*;
• to have a constant real interest rate, all real asset stocks should be on a
balanced growth path with GDP, which for public debt, in real terms,
implies D*t/D*t-1 = 1 + q*, all t (i.e. a constant real debt/GDP ratio,
D*t/Y*t = d*, all t );
• consequently, real interest payments, IPt = r*Dt-1, also grow at the GDP
rate, IP*t/IP*t-1 = 1 + q* (i.e. they are constant as a ratio to GDP,
IP*t/Y*t = r*d* );
8• the government budget, in real terms, must satisfy the condition B*t =
−q* D*t-1, which implies a target value for the primary balance such that
PB*t = −q*D*t-1 + IP*t; as a consequence, PB*t/PB*t-1 = 1 + q* (i.e. both
the total and the primary balance/GDP ratios are constant, B*t/Y*t =
*1
**
q
qd
+
− ,  PB*t/Y*t = *1
***
q
qrd
+
− );
• a sufficient condition for targets on primary expenditure G*t and total
tax revenue T*t to satisfy  the primary balance constraint is that
G*t/G*t-1 = T*t/T*t-1 = 1 + q* (i.e. constant ratios to GDP);
It is well-known that the SGP arithmetics is consistent with this
reference state as long as q* = 3%, pi* = 2%, and d* = 60%, which yield a
target deficit/GDP ratio of 5% in nominal terms. The target primary
budget/GDP ratio can be close to balance on the “classical” assumption that
r* = q*. The recommendation that the target total budget be “close to
balance or in surplus” implies a positive target primary balance, and a
reduction of any non-zero debt/GDP ratio, along the GDP potential path.
Now let qt be the actual growth rate of a variable xt in logs, i.e. qt = xt
− xt-1, and q*t = x*t − x*t-1  its target growth rate. Clearly, the growth gap of xt
is given by qt − q*t = ∆xt − ∆x*t = txˆ  − 1ˆ −tx = ∆ txˆ . Thus, the system (1-bis)-(4)
has to be transformed in order to get the rates of change, i.e. the time first
differences, of the left-hand-side variables. This specification gives
prominence to the time structure − “leads and lags” − of the estimation
model. The underlying theoretical model presented in the previous
paragraph is too simple to give guidance. But economic theory in general
does not deliver univocal results concerning the time structure of dynamic
models. Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models stress the role of
rational forward-looking behaviour such that expected future variables
determine current ones. However, they deny the relevance of, or are mute
about, the role of lagged variables which by contrast are largely used in
econometric practice. Agnostically, one might put the model under test in a
general dynamic form, whereby all endogenous and exogenous variables
enter with current and lagged values, and “let the data say” what the best
time structure is, in the spirit of the "general-to-specific" approach. It
follows that, given the theoretical structure provided by model (1-bis)-(4),
the general system we have deployed for estimation is:
9           
tt
ttttt
uzLC
LCgLCrLCyLCcy
1115
14131211110
)(           
ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ
++
+τ∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆
−          (7)
ttttt uzLCyLCLCc 22232212120 )( ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ ++∆+pi∆+=pi∆ −  (8)
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ttttt
uzLC
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34333213130
)(          
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+∆+pi∆+pi∆+∆+=∆
−         (9)
ttttt uzLCyLCgLCcg 44434214140 )(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ ++∆+∆+=∆ −            (10)
ttttt uzLCyLCLCc 55535215150 )(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ ++∆+τ∆+=τ∆ − (11)
where ∆ is the time first-difference operator, Cij(L) are polynomial of
coefficients in the time-lag operator L, gt is the log of the real primary public
expenditure at time t, τt is the log of the real total tax revenue, rt = it − pit+1
is the one-year real interest rate,  zit  are exogenous variables to be specified
below, and finally uit are stochastic shocks with the usual properties.
The estimation model (7)-(11) differs from (1-bis)-(4) with respect to a
few important features. First of all, let us draw attention to the correct
interpretation of this model. It aims at representing an economy in which all
real variables and prices grow over time. In steady-state, each variable
grows along its balanced growth path as explained above. The reader can
easly check that as the vectors of shocks ut and of exogenous variables zt
are null, so is the vector of the endogenous variables vt = [∆ tyˆ , tpi∆ , ∆it,
tgˆ∆ , tτˆ∆ ], meaning that all real variables and prices lie on their steady-state
growth path while the nominal interest rate is constant at its target value i*
= r* + pi*.
The problem of interest is the system’s dynamic response when one or
more variables are shocked and display positive or negative growth gaps. A
crucial part of the problem is how the policy variables react in the presence
of undesired growth gaps in the relevant variables. The policy-relevant
growth gaps are those in real GDP (for both policy arms) and in the inflation
rate (for the monetary arm). GDP growth gaps are expressed by equation
(7), which is derived by first differencing equation (1-bis) after splitting the
fiscal stance into the two primitive components of real primary expenditure
and real tax revenue (see also below). Inflation growth gaps are expressed
by equation (8), which is in turn the first difference of equation (2), that is
its “accelerationist” version which measures by how much the inflation rate
accelerates above, or decelerates below, the target rate.
The policy reaction functions constitute the second noteworthy
characteristic of our model. These are given by equations (9) to (11),
10
whereby the monetary variable is moved above or below its target level,
whereas the two fiscal variables react by growing more or less than their
target rate. The monetary policy equation (9) is just the “accelerationist”
version of the standard Taylor rule (3) consistent with the “accelerationist”
equation for inflation (8). With respect to equation (4), fiscal policy is
represented by two separate symmetric fiscal reaction functions, one for real
primary public expenditure (10) and the other for real total tax revenue (11).
This allows us to study the cyclical and non-cyclical components  for each
fiscal variable separetely as emerging in the recent theoretical and empirical
literature on fiscal rules (e.g. Perotti (2002), Galì and Perotti (2003), Favero
(2002), Melitz (2005)).  Moreover, contrary to common practice both in
theoretical and empirical models, fiscal policy rules are here measured in
absolute real terms instead of ratios to GDP. As stressed by Melitz (2005)
the two specifications yield different empirical results and lead to different
policy implications. In particular, the coefficients of our fiscal policy
equations  estimate the exact elasticity of each real fiscal variable to growth
gaps (not merely to output gaps), whereas the cyclical elasticity of total
budget can correctly be derived by compounding the partial elasticities of
each component. Thanks to this estimation of the elasticities of primitive
fiscal variables, also the notorious pitfall of fiscal ratios to GDP, which stir
the cyclical components of the numerator and of the denominator, can easily
be corrected gaining important information as will be seen by means of
simulations.
2.3. The empirical strategy
The general dynamic structural model (7)-(11) sets the stage for an
econometric exercise aimed at comparing the experiences of Italy and
Germany. In view of estimation, a few thorny problems had to be addressed.
The first problem to be discussed concerns the assumption of structural
stability underlying any econometric exercise. As is well known, this issue is
particularly delicate when behaviour of institutions is involved, especially in
view of extrapolations across institutional regimes9. We are aware of the
number of institutional events that occured in the time period covered by
our data set. The most important to be taken into account are the end of the
                                           
9 Alas, the caution necessary on this ground is seldom practiced. For instance,
many tests of the feasibility of the SGP constraints were based on evidence of past
performances of EU countries under completely different insitutional regimes.
11
Bretton Woods exchange-rates system (1971), participation in the European
Monetary System (1979-98 for Germany; 1980-92, 1996-98 for Italy),
national reunification of Germany (1989), endorsement of the Maastricht
Treaty’s criteria for admission to EMU (1992) and subsequently of the SGP
(1996), inception of EMU (1999). All these events are major candidates of
structural changes in the data generating process, especially as regards
policy variables. As a first step, a priori information on institutional events
has been introdcued by means of dummy variables; the dummies that have
proved to be significant or that have altered the quality of estatimates
significantly are reported with the results below. Of course, we do not
conclude that the events which are not associated with these selected
dummies are irrelevant; simply, we leave the matter for further and more
rigorous investigation.
A few more words of clarification are perhaps needed in relation to
the most radical event, that is EMU, with the undisputable consequence
that the two independent national institutions responsible for monetary
policy as described by equation (9) have been substituted by the ECB.
Unfortunately, the very small number of yearly observations available in
the EMU period prevents reliable statistical analysis of either a structural
break in the monetary policy equation of the two countries or estimation of
an independent equation. In the face of the trade-off between curtailing the
sample period in 1998 and loosing observations and degrees of freedom on
the one hand, and including the EMU sub-period with a likely structural
break on the other, we have opted for the second choice. Hopefully, the small
number of observations may also limit the statistical relevance of this
break10.
Historical and institutional considerations have instead led us to
envisage country-specific formats of the monetary policy variables. The
standard Taylor rule (3), on which our “accelerationist” version (9) is based,
can hardly be applied straightforwardly to our specific cases. The Taylor
rule has been conceived with reference to a “large”, independent, almost
                                           
10 On the other hand, the literature on the ECB points out that major central
banks in Europe had long pursued converging frames and practices of policy
conduct in view of the creation of the single central bank. And that the latter has
indeed mostly endorsed and codified this heritage from predecessors, in particular
from the Bundesbank (see e.g. Dornbush et al. (1998), Begg et al. (1999), and for
the Bank of Italy Angeloni (1994)).
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“closed” economy where the central bank can freely set and pursue its own
targets. As regards Italy, none of these preconditions was ever true. First,
over a considerable part of the sample period (1962-71; 1980-92, 1996-98),
Italy was part of exchange-rate agreements (Bretton Woods and the
European Monetary System, respectively) which limited her central bank’s
ability to manage an independent monetary policy. Second, it is known that
the Bank of Italy did not adopt explicit inflation targeting policy until the
second half of the 1980s, though it can be argued that an exchange-rate
target implies a target on domestic inflation vis-à-vis major trading partners
(Visco (1995)). Thus, we have first considered a specification of equation (9)
on the hypothesis that the Bank of Italy had an implicit target given by the
German inflation rate until 1998, to be subsequently substituted by the
inflation target officially set by the ECB11, i.e.
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 As an alternative, we have also tried a more radical re-specification of
equation (9) in consideration of the interest-rate parity constraint that an
open economy within exchange-rate agreements like Italy had to face most
of the time between 1962 and 1998. True, this constraint was not always
equally strong and binding. In the Bretton Woods era low and controlled
capital mobility allowed substantial room for domestic monetary policy. By
contrast, according to well-established interpretations, monetary policy of
non-German member countries in the EMS was severely constrained by
interest-rate parity vis-à-vis Germany, and anti-inflationary monetary
policy was mainly run not by chosing the domestic inflation target but by
anchoring the domestic nominal interest rate to the German one (Visco
(1995), Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)). Accordingly, the domestic inflation
components, ∆pit and tpi∆ , in equation (9) should be replaced by  the interest-
rate parity constraint with Germany,
itGER + Et(∆et)
where Et is the expectation operator, et is the log of the nominal lira-DM
exchange rate and ∆et > 0 is the lira depreciation rate.  Assuming that the
                                           
11 The ECB target has since been left unchanged at 2%. As a consequence of a
constant target, our “accelerationist” specification implies that the inflation-
targeting variableis just equal to observed acceleration in the inflation rate,
therefore ITAtpi∆ˆ  reduces to ITAtpi∆ .
13
latter is determined by the inflation differential, and taking the first
difference of the previous expression we obtain
∆itGER + ITAtpi∆ˆ
That is to say, changes  in the Italian interest rate should be
explained by changes  in the German rate and/or in the inflation differential
with Germany. On the other hand, the interest-parity constraint may be
made consistent with the remaining part of equation (9) since the presence
of factors relaxing the constraint (e.g. capital controls, fluctuation bands of
the exchange rate, realignments, etc)  allows domestic growth targeting to
some extent. In consideration of the historically strong commercial and
financial ties between Italy and Germany, we have tested the version of
equation (9) corrected for the interest-parity constraint  for the whole
sample period. To account for major institutional events in the sample
period, however, two dummies have also been added for 1980 (participation
in the EMS) and 1992 (breakdown of the EMS parity).
As regards Germany, too, we have considered two possible
specifications of the inflation-targeting component of equation (9). The first
assumes that the inflation target may be variable over time; hence this has
required a historical reconstruction of the official inflation target of the
Bundesbank (as provided e.g. by Geberding et al. (2004)). The second follows
the widely held belief that the ECB has substantially reproduced the
monetary policy framework of the Bundesbank, which amounts to imposing
that the inflation target for Germany has constantly been equal to 2%.
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It should be noted, however, that according to the available reconstruction,
the official inflation target of the Bundesbank, though not always equal to
2% until 1987, was rarely changed. Therefore, the two specifications of
GER
tpi∆ˆ  produce two time series almost coincident with the actual change in
the inflation rate. According to widely shared a priori information, we have
also added a dummy variable for the post-reunification shock dated at 1991.
In the third place, the general dynamic format (7)-(11) of the model is
open to further specifications and restrictions regarding exogenous variables
zit  as well as the model's time structure. To begin with exogenous variables,
we have aimed at a parsimonious selection first on theoretical and then on
empirical grounds. Since our main theoretical interest is in policy variables,
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we have sought to enrich their respective specifications with particular
attention to the channels through which fiscal-monetary policy interactions
operate. These cannot be limited to the general-equilibrium feedbacks
usually considered in the policy-mix literature.12 Interdependences between
fiscal and monetary policies are likely to materialize also directly, in that
instruments controlled by the monetary authority enter as right-hand-
variables into the the policy rule of the fiscal authority, and vice-versa.
 Consider first the monetary policy equation (9) and the underlying
standard Taylor rule (3) with the “real anchor” of the nominal interest rate
in the neutral real interest rate r*. In the light of equation (5), which relates
r* to the structural fiscal stance, we have specified equation (9) to control for
the possibility that the central bank tracks the dynamics of r* by means of
the deviation-from-target of the public debt’s rate of change.13 Hence,
z3t  = ∆ tbˆ
where bt is ratio of the current public deficit to the previous year’s stock of
debt.
As to the fiscal rules, we have followed Favero's (2002) specification,
where the most important feed-back channel from monetary to fiscal policy
is seen in interest payments. Given outstanding debt, changes in the
interest rate impinge on current interest payments directly. This variable
also relates to another issue in fiscal policy rules and the SGP debate, that
is “budget smoothing”: the fiscal authority is assumed to respond to changes
in the deviation-from-target of interest payments by adjusting the primary
balance according to the total budget target. Therefore, we have chosen
z4t  = z5t  = ∆ tPIˆ
where IPt measures real interest payments. Non-null estimates of the
relevant parameters, by controlling for the existence of budget smoothing,
would provide evidence for a direct feedback from monetary to fiscal policy.
We have also considered that both Italy and Germany are highly open
economies, and we have thought it wise to control their GDP growth gaps
                                           
12 See, inter alia, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) and Benigno and Woodford (2003)
for DGE New-Keynesian models, Dixit and Lambertini (2001) for a game-theoretic
approach, and Muscatelli et al. (2004) for empirical estimations.
13 The problem of a time-varying real anchor of the nominal interest rate in the
Taylor rule is throughly discussed by Woodford (2003). The choice of  the rate of
change of public debt instead of the public deficit  as a proxy for the neutral real
rate of interest can be justified by recalling that in a complete general-equilibrium
framework r* should be also consistent with capital market equilibrium.
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for worldwide cyclical factors that we have proxied with the US growth gap,
i.e.
z1t = ∆
US
tyˆ
Finally, there comes the specification of steady-state and target
variables that are needed to compute our deviation variables. Though not
free from faults, the only generally accepted and officially certified variable
in this category is the year potential GDP. The other target variables
present in our model are ususally matter of conjectures or separate
estimates by indepedent researchers. This circumstance is unfortunate since
it introduces hidden joint hypotheses and spurious variables in the
statistical analysis of the model, the more so the more sofisticated is the
separate estimate of the target variable(s). The problem is particularly
serious for fiscal variables. The SGP targets are of little help for our study.
First, because they were not in place for a long part of the time span of our
database, even allowing for anticipation of the new rules as early as 1992.
Second, because they are aggregate targets, whereas we wish to study the
disaggregate components of the government budget. Further, available
empirical results about fiscal target variables  are less developed and more
controversial than in the case of monetary ones. The official statistics closest
to our theoretical variables are the so-called “structural” or “cyclically
adjusted” fiscal items and balances released by national and international
institutions. These are, however, far from satisfactory since they are fraught
with arbitrariness in the a priori distinction between “structural” and
“cyclical” components as well as in the econometric methodologies
employed.14 The foregoing considerations have led us to choose the least
prejudged empirical strategy. In line with the theoretical structure of
Section 2, we have assumed that the year before our sample started (i.e., in
1961) the values for primary expenditures, fiscal revenues, public debt and
interest payments were exactly at their target, and that from the following
year onwards all these fiscal variables, if undisturbed, would grow along
their balanced growth path, i.e. at a rate equal to the potential GPD growth
rate, i.e.:
∆g*t = ∆τ*t = ∆b*t = ∆IP*t = ∆y*t.
                                           
14 See Perotti (2002), Galì and Perotti (2003), Melitz (2005) for recent discussions of
these problems.
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The source for the data are yearly observations for each primitive
variable in the OECD CD-Rom Database over the period 1962-200415.
Elaborations on primitive variables to obtain estimation variables are those
described in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2. Time series of selected estimation
variables are reproduced in Appendix, figure 1.  We have used the 3SLS
method with instrumental variables to correct for simultaneity. As to the
time structure of the model, unconstrained estimation of system (7)-(11)
would be too demanding in our case given the insufficient amount of
observations relative to the number of coefficients to be estimated. Thus, we
have proceeded by imposing resctrictions based on a priori theoretical or
empirical information.
In the first round (Estimation I),
• we have  restricted the time structure of system (7)-(11) to current and 1-
period lagged values of all variables; a justification for this choice may be
that all variables are first differences, and it is known that such
variables generally display low order or no autoregressive structures
• as regards the monetary policy equation (9), we have further restricted
the time structure to contemporaneous values of explanatory variables
only; first, because there are neither theoretical foundations nor existing
empirical results that justify the inclusion of lagged values for the
inflation and growth targeting variables; second, because though current
estimates of monetary policy rules provide some evidence that lagged
values of the interest rate are significant on a very short term basis
(“interest rate smoothing”), yearly observations suggest that the
adjustment process has fully been accomplished.
No estimated equation, except (9), has obtained statistically significant
coefficients.
This result has confirmed our prior that data in first-difference of
rates of deviation do not display significant autoregressive structures.
                                           
15 Primitive variables are: Gross domestic product at current market prices (ITA,
GER, US), Potential output at current market prices (ITA, GER, US), GDP deflator
(1995 = 100) (ITA, GER, US), Government non-interest expenditure at current
market prices (ITA, GER), Government interest payments (ITA, GER), Total tax
revenue at current market prices (ITA, GER), Government net borrowing and
lending (ITA, GER), Public debt (ITA, GER), Short-term interest rate (ITA, GER),
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Hence, subsequently we have run alternative estimations under further
restrictions, the main being that all lagged endogenous variables, except
inflation in equation (9), were dropped from their own equation. In
particular, in Estimations II and III we have further resctricted the time
structure of equations for real variables (7), (10), (11) according to two
alternative hypotheses both present in the relevant literature16. The first
hypothesis (Estimation II) is that deviations from the growth paths of
private spending, public spending and taxation affect GDP in the same year,
but observed GDP growth gaps affect the fiscal variables with 1-year lag
(decision-making and administrative processes, and build-up time delay
implementation). The second hypothesis (Estimation III) goes the other way
round  (policy reaction is contemporaneous, but it is economic effects after
implementation that take time to unfold)17. As is often the case, estimation
results do not allow for univocal ranking of the alternative specifications.
However, the most satisfactory outcome along the threefold dimension of
statistical significance, theoretical consistency and empirical plausibility
with pre-existing evidence has been produced by Estimation III. In the
system’s unrestricted reduced form (URF) for both countries no test has
revealed any considerable problem: no evidence of significant first order
residual autocorrelation and normality seems a good approximation to the
residuals distributional shape. Therefore, we have considered the system
specification and its lag structure as a congruent representation of the data.
The results, with the instrumental variables employed, are presented in
Table 1.
Equation for ∆ tyˆ . One variable is strongly significant (p-value < 5% )
with expected (negative) sign for both countries, that is the change in the
real interest rate anticipated one year earlier (that should trigger a
deviation of private expenditure from its growth path one year earlier). The
US GDP growth gaps, that we interpret as world business cycles, turn out to
be strongly significant for Germany, but very weakly significant or
rejectable for Italy (p-value > 10%). For both countries, the two (1-year
                                           
16 See e.g. recent econometric works on VAR models of fiscal policy (Galì and
Perotti (2003))
17 This second hypothesis also hinges on the extent of so-called “automatic
stabilizers” in the fiscal system: the larger their share, the faster the cyclical
response of the fiscal variables.
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lagged) fiscal variables present the expected sign, but are definitely non-
significant18.
As a matter of fact, the relationship between GDP and fiscal variables
is notoriously open to debate. Not only is the evidence inconclusive, but
different views are deeply rooted in theoretical unresolved issues.  To say
the least, international evidence allows no firmer conclusion than that the
effects of fiscal variables on GDP may differ substantially across countries,
in some countries being apparently weak and/or shrinking over time (see
e.g. more recent works by Perotti (2002), Galì and Perotti (2003)). However,
as explained above, our estimation differs from most of the reference
literature in that it yields the exact  elasticity of GDP growth gaps to real
fiscal variables growth gaps. Hence, our results may have a statistical origin
in that GDP growth gaps show low variability vis-à-vis remarkably high
variability of rates of change in real fiscal variables. On the other hand, at
least for Italy, the latter also embody the high variability of the inflation
rate, which is not under direct control of fiscal policy. It should also be
considered that GDP growth gaps may be due to a combined deviation of
observed GDP growth from the potential path and a shock to the path itself.
There seems to be a possible paradox here. Suppose that both observed and
potential GDP depend on real fiscal variables (see e.g. Barro (1990)); then if,
say, during a downturn the government spends more and/or taxes less, the
result may be that the observed GDP rises while the potential GDP is also
revised upwards to the effect that the gap is not closed.
Equation for ∆pit. The estimated equation supports the
“accelerationist” version of the AS curve for both countries, though Germany
displays negligible persistence of  changes in the inflation rate, whereas
Italy shows a remarkably large effect of GDP growth gaps.
Equation for ∆it . No component of our “accelerationist” monetary
policy equations is to be rejected statistically, with the theoretical sign and
with high confidence (p-values < 5%). As to Italy, between the inflation-
targeting hypothesis based on the German inflation rate and the one based
on the German interest-rate parity constraint, estimates show that
introduction of the latter displaces the former in significance, so that table 1
reports this specification. Our interpretation is that the Bank of Italy has
                                           
18 In the alternative estimations the two fiscal variables are always non-significant
and with the wrong sign.
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substantially tracked the interest-rate parity with Germany, corrected for
the risk premium proxied by the excess growth rate of public debt, while
trading-off GDP growth gaps. As regards the alternative specifications for
Germany (one with the reconstructed time variant inflation target and one
with the imposed constant target of 2%), the two, as was to be expected, are
statistically undistinguishable from the actual change in the inflation rate,
which results to be significant and with the correct positive sign.
As one may expect, our estimated monetary-policy equations show
that in Italy more weight has been given to growth-targeting than to
inflation-targeting  whereas the opposite occured in Germany. On the other
hand, the so-called “Taylor principle” materializes in neither country, that is
to say the estimated coefficient of the inflation gap is, in fact, less than one.
Notably, the rate of change of public debt, unlike Italy, turns out to be non-
significant for Germany. We believe that this is an expected and informative
result. In fact, as explained above, we have introduced this variable as a
measure of the fiscal pressure on the real interest rate that the central bank
is assumed to adopt as the anchor of  its nominal interest-rate policy. It
comes therefore with no surprise that in two countries with sharp
differences in the speed of public-debt growth, the monetary policy rules
differ in that the central bank facing slow-growing debt (Germany) has
given no weight to this variable, whereas the one facing fast-growing debt
(Italy) has given substantial weight to it.
Equations for ∆gt and ∆τt. First of all, both countries display sizeable
anti-cyclical contemporaneus components of the rate of change of real fiscal
variables. In fact, the parameters of GDP growth gaps are  strongly
significant and with the theoretical sign (p-values < 5%). Traditional
wisdom concerning the “long and variable lags” of fiscal policy does not seem
confirmed, or else, the importance and extent of in-built stabilizers is
vindicated (see also Melitz (2005)). The information we gain about the
magnitude of  elasticites to contemporaneous growth gaps is that
• expenditure elasticity is about −1.1 in both countries
• taxation elasticity is about 0.5 in Italy and 1.8 in Germany
At first sight, both elasticities in the two countries are much larger
than in other empirical studies, where they result around 0.3 in absolute
value, and where 0.5 is regarded as the typical elasticity of the total budget
(see e.g. Giorno et. al. (1995), Artis and Buti (2000), van den Noord (2000),
Brunila et al. (2002)). Italy is also at variance with received wisdom which
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wants taxation as the more elastic stabilizer. Yet, as already discussed
previously, our results are not directly  comparable with strandard practice
in the field which typically a) estimates fiscal rules in isolation, and b)
measures the elasticity of fiscal-GDP ratios to output gaps, both in levels. A
measurement (partially) comparable to ours has been proposed by Melitz
(2005, Table 1a) who, in a panel of euro-countries, has in fact found slightly
lager values of the elasticities of first differences of both public expenditure
and taxation to first differences in output gaps. It should also be considered
that the difference between our estimated values and the others may
simply be due to the algebra of respecification (empirically, estimates may
be  roughly equivalent)19 . Anyway, our aim here is not so much to dispute
the magnitude of the cycle elasticites of fiscal variables as to focus on the
implications of our proposed change of approach with regard to the
assessment of the government budget over the cycle, one implication being
that knowing such elasticities, if ever possible, per se conveys little
information. These implications will be clarified with the help of the
simulations.
Neither Italy nor Germany pass the budget-smoothing hypothesis,
that is sensitivity of primary fiscal variables to the evolution of interest
payments. The respective parameters are negligible in size and non-
significant (in all alternative estimations too). If taken at face value, only
Italy displays the correct sign. This result may disappoint the presumption
that at least Germany had a well-behaved fiscal rule20. Another
interpretation is, however, possible, which is consistent with the difference
                                           
19Consider any fiscal variable in  isolation ft, in relation to a cyclical measure of
GDP only. Our "growth-gaps" specification is
∆ tfˆ = α + β∆ tyˆ  + ut
Upon expanding this expression according our definition of growth gap and
rearranging, it is possible to obtain a respecification in the following form:
(ft − yt ) = α + (ft-1 − yt-1 ) + (1 − β)(yt − y*t ) + (1 − β)(yt-1 − y*t-1 ) + ut
This is the standard specification of an estimation equation for the fiscal variable /
GDP ratio (ft − yt ) in level, regressed on its own lagged value and on the current
and lagged value of the output gap in level (see e.g. Melitz (2002) and Favero
(2002)). Clearly, the cyclical coefficents estimated in the standard specification are
complements to those estimated by way of the "growth-gaps" specification; if the
former are smaller than 0.5, the latter will result larger than 0.5.
20On the other hand, Favero (2002) has found that both Germany and Italy
performed budget-smoothing to some extent.
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in the two countries' monetary rules that have beeen detected above.
Namely that a virtuous fiscal-monetary circle was in place in the slow-
growing-debt country (Germany) and a vicious one in the fast-growing-debt
country (Italy). In the former country, the mutual sensitivity between fiscal
and monetary policy is negligible as slow-growing debt, low and stable
interest rate and sustainable interest payments are mutually consistent.
The opposite occurs in the latter country, where the fast-growing debt forces
mutual sensitivity between fiscal and monetary policy.
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
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By means of the estimated system, it has been possibile to simulate
the responses of the endogenous variables to exogenous shocks21. Here we
only report as an example the results of a −1% temporary shock to the GDP
growth below potential at time 0 (1963), with no other shock thereon. The
simulation yields, for each endogenous variable, the percent rate of
deviation from the correspondent baseline value (which, for analogy with
the theoretical model, we still denote by ∆(^))22. Recall that in our model the
baseline value is a growth rate for all real variables and the price level, and
a constant for the nominal interest rate.
In order to gather information on the government budget, we have
also used the simulated dynamics of the endogenous variables to compute
relevant compound budget variables  such as
• real primary balance: gBP t ˆˆˆ ∆−τ∆=∆
• real interest payments: ∆ tPIˆ  = ∆it− ∆ tpˆi
• total budget: tBˆ∆  = tBPˆ∆  − ∆ tPIˆ
Thus, in the simulation, the primary balance deviates from its
baseline value by the difference between the deviations of the tax revenue
                                           
21 The simulation software was WinSolve.
22 It should be borne in mind that the simulator creates the baseline value of each
endogenous variable for each point in time by means of an initial simulation of the
estimated system whereby the system is fed with the “true” times series of the
exogenous variables used in the econometric estimation. These same time series
are also used in the simulation. Hence, the simulation results should be understood
as deviations of the endogenous variables from their “historical” estimated values
in the absence of shocks. This procedure also implies that simulation results are
“history sensitive” in that they depend on the shock date chosen and on the true
historical values of the exogenous variables.
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and of the the primary expenditure. The deviation rate of real interest
payments is approximated by the change of the real interest rate on
outstanding debt. As to total budget, it deviates form its baseline value by
the difference between the deviations of interest payments and of the
primary balance.
The graphs in Appendix (figures 2 and 3) show the post-shock
dynamics of the five primitive endogenous variables (∆ tyˆ , ∆ tpˆi , ∆ tiˆ , ∆ tgˆ ,
∆ tτˆ ) and of the two generated variables ( tBPˆ∆ , tBˆ∆ ) for the two countries.
The following comments are in order.
Stability and transitory dynamics. All variables are dynamically
stable with low persistence in both countries. In fact, deviations in all
variables shrink to zero in a relative small number of rounds. In other
words, each variable returns to its baseline value.  Transitory dynamics is
almost monotonic for all variables in both countries, except inflation in
Italy. It is also consistent with standard macroeconomics. As regards Italy,
on impact we see a typical pattern of demand shock: the negative growth
gap triggers a deceleration in the inflation rate and anti-cyclical policy
adjustments. The nominal interest rate is reduced though less than the
deceleration of inflation: the real interest rate deviates above the neutral
rate most of the time. Fiscal stabilization consists of a sequence of impulses
accelerating primary expenditure and decelerating tax revenue with respect
to baseline growth rates. Consequently, the economy is set on a path of
negative growth gaps of decreasing magnitude up to zero. Germany instead
shows a typical pattern of supply shock: on impact of the negative growth
gap the simulation yields an acceleration of inflation. Now the policy
variables react in opposite directions. The nominal interest rate
immediately rises, though not as much as the acceleration of inflation; yet
subsequent adjustments bring the real interest rate above the neutral rate.
Fiscal variables react to the negative GDP growth gap as expected until the
gap is progressively reduced to zero.
Elasticities and stabilization capacity: measurement puzzles. How
should we measure stabilization capacity, and the ensuing budget
requirements correctly? Are estimated elasticities of fiscal variables to a
cyclical measure of GDP really informative? If fiscal variables do respond
"automatically" to growth shocks, these "shocks" − as they are usually
intended in models − are unobservable, while estimates are based on
observed data which probably already embody at least some of the
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stabilization effects of fiscal variables on GDP and vice versa. Our
simulation exercise allows us to disentagle this matter. First, we have a well
defined shock, and secondly we can track the reponse of fiscal variables
precisely up to the new steady state. We can thus distinguish (at least) two
measures of elasticities with respect to the shock, a) on impact of the shock,
and b) in the new steady state, that is the cumulated rates of deviation of
fiscal variables from target necessary to nullify the initial GDP growth gap
(the "integrals" of the graphs in figures 2 and 3). The respective values are
reported in table 2.
As can be seen, steady-state elasticities are smaller than impact ones,
with one important exception. Let us look at the primary versus total
budget. In Italy as well as in Germany, on impact both variables deteriorate
relative to their baseline value by roughly the same amount (about 1.7% in
Italy and 1.0% in Germany). However, the paths of the primary and total
budgets differ markedly in Italy with respect to Germany (see figures 2 and
3, panel (f)). In the latter country the two measures of fiscal stance roughly
follow the same monotonic path. In Italy, by contrast, the total budget
worsens at higher (absolute) rates and for a longer time than the primary
budget. Hence, the steady-state elasticity of the total budget is amazingly
higher in Italy than in Germany, though the underlying fiscal rules are
quite similar in the two countries. The difference is due to real interest
payments. As we know, in Italy, though the nominal interest rate is
reduced, the inflation rate decelerates even more imposing a sequence of
inflation-tax cuts. Thus, real interest payments rise most of the time,
whereas the opposite occurs in Germany.
This exercise provides an instance of the idea that the total budget is
not under full control of the government over the cycle even when the
government does "let the automatic stabilizers work" and does not engage in
discretionary activism. Even if an almighty econometrician could tell us the
exact elasticities of primary fiscal variables to growth shocks, still we would
be unable to infer the evolution of the government budget unless we also
knew all the details of the underlying macroeconomic process. A major
"detail" is that the actual cyclical evolution of total budget is closely
dependent on the concomitant monetary-fiscal interactions.
 Monetary-fiscal interactions. Since in Italy more weight is given to
growth-targeting than to inflation-targeting  whereas the opposite occurs in
Germany, this may explain the handbook reactions of monetary policy both
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in the deflationary case of Italy and in the stagflationary case of Germany.
On the other hand, the nominal interest rate does not over-react to
deviations of inflation from target causing, at first sight, unintended
movements in the real interest rate: it rises in Italy and falls in Germany (at
least initially). One reason may be that in both countries the estimated
coefficient of the inflation gap is, in fact, less than one. Another reason of
interest is that our monetary-policy equations also respond to public debt
dynamics as a determinant of the neutral real interest rate. As remarked
above, the coefficient of this variable is significant and positive for Italy
whereas it is not for Germany. Since this variable in the sample period of
the simulation is rapidly increasing in Italy, the ensuing “fiscal spillover”
may reduce the responsiveness of  monetary policy and sustain the rise in
the real interest rate. Now let us look at the other side of the monetary-
fiscal interactions. The channel of interaction going from the monetary to
the fiscal side on which we have focused in our model is interest payments.
These enter the fiscal equations under the hypothesis of “budget smoothing”
on the part of governments. Estimation results reject this hypothesis for
both countries. Nonetheless, interest payments also exert direct influence on
the evolution of the total budget as seen above.
One may be tempted to conclude from our exercise that in a slow-
growing-debt country not only are fiscal and monetary policy complements23
but can also be (virtually) independent. By contrast, in a fast-growing-debt
country the two policies may still be complements but not independent. As a
consequence, in the first type of country both policies can be more aggressive
with less overall impact on the total budget, whereas in the second type of
country one policy checks the other and nonetheless they leave an overall
negative effect on the total budget.
Rates of deviations, levels and the SGP rules. Let us finally examine
the debated question of the cyclical evolution of the deficit/GDP ratio. To
this end, we have to go back from rates of deviation to levels, which also
ease comparison between our results and existing ones. The interpretation
of the foregoing results within our theoretical model is that the growth rates
of output, tax revenue, primary expenditure and prices return to their
                                           
23 It should be stressed that complementarity emerges in our simulation of a GDP
shock. Preliminary inspections of different shocks, such as inflationary or fiscal
shocks, indicate that the two policies are used as substitutes. A similar result can
be found in Muscatelli et al. (2004).
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respective initial values. This, however, does not imply that the levels of
those variables will thereon be equal to those that would have obtained
along the growth path of the economy in the absence of the shock. To verify
this property, the simulation data in rates of deviations from baseline
values can easily be converted into data in levels (index numbers)24. This
exercise shows that, for instance, a temporary negative gap in the growth
rate of output determines a permanent output gap in levels. Likewise, a
temporary positive growth gap in public expenditure will end up with a
permanent positive gap in level, etc. In this respect, an important
information is given by the cumulative deviations of the variables discussed
above, which determine the respective gaps in levels in the new steady
state. The latter are reported in table 3 both for absolute fiscal variables and
for their GDP ratios
Let us first consider final output gaps, which are −1.04% for Italy and
−0.57% for Germany. This means that in Italy the initial growth shock
leaves behind a permanent output gap of the same magnitude, whereas in
Germany it is almost halved. In both countries the bulk of stabilization is
borne by primary expenditure (particularly in Italy) rather than by taxation
as presumed by most studies on automatic stabilizers (on this point see also
Melitz (2005)). Remarkably, however, the stronger stabilization capacity of
Germany is obtained with less fiscal effort as measured by the cumulative
deterioration of the primary balance, which reaches −1.57% of  baseline
value in Italy but stops at –0.94% in Germany. Notice that figures are
somewhat different if measured in ratios to GDP: in particular, the
expenditure/GDP and taxation/GDP ratios are larger than the gaps in
absolute terms (overestimating the increase in expenditure and
underestimating the reduction in taxation − which even appears to have
been increased). The well-known reason is that GDP ratios embody the
lower level of the denominator25.
                                           
24 Let X0 = 100 be the initial absolute value of any variable. Then for any t = 1, …,
the new level along the steady-state growth path of the economy is given by
X*t = X*t-1(1 + q*t), whereas the new level after the shock is given by Xt = Xt-1(1 +
q*t + ∆ txˆ ). We have taken q*t to be the potential growth rate of GDP in the data
set for each country, and, according to the theoretical model, we have used it also
for fiscal variables.
25 The figures in table 3 further exemplify the pitfalls of estimation of ex-post
elasticities mentioned previously. These figures in fact closely resemble the typical
statistical information available, that is realized output gaps on the one hand, and
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In any case, these figures deliver an important message that concerns
the new exemption clauses introduced by the SGP reform. As reported in
the Introduction, these clauses correctly recongize that not only negative
growth rates, but also "prolonged" negative growth gaps (while the absolute
growth rate may remain positive) may account for "exceptional" fiscal
deficits. They also give right relevance to the related concept of "cumulated
loss of output". These are welcome amendments, which however will need
careful re-examination of assessment criteria  of fiscal stances of member
countries.
First of all, unlike the sparse occurences of the old definition of
“exceptional recessions” found by Buti and Sapir (1998) from 1961 to 1997,
one should expect statistics − if not interested governments − to report
negative growth gaps roughly half of the times owing to the sheer statistical
artifact that these are stationary variables around the trend (see figure 1).
And we have seen that econometric analysis does support the hypothesis
that fiscal variables are highly sensitive to this measure of the business
cycle. Further, cycles are typically characterized by strings of negative and
positive growth gaps. Consequently, strings of negative years impinging
upon fiscal balances are frequent events rather than exceptional ones. Our
simulated steady-state elasticities suggest that in a country like Italy, even
starting from balance, the 3% deficit/GDP ratio might be reached after 2
years of negative growth gaps in the order of 1%, not an infrequent
occurence in the sample. These findings shed doubts on early assessments
on the substantial safety margin guaranteed by the 3% deficit ceiling (e.g.
Buti and Sapir (1998), Artis and Buti (2000)).
Secondly, we have seen that "cumulated losses of output" indeed have
far reaching consequences. Temporary growth gaps leave long-lasting traces
in public finances, even in well-managed (simulated) public finances.
Looking at the statistics of our simulated economies, the SGP guardians
might be tempted to conclude that, as the GDP is driven back to its
potential growth rate, there is no longer justification for a deficit. However,
the extant primary deficit − not to mention the total deficit − though created
_____________________________
changes in absolute fiscal variables or in their GDP ratios on the other. Yet table 3
makes it apparent that, whereas the data have been generated by the same growth
shock in the two countries, ex-post elasticites in Germany would be grossly
overstimated for the mere fact that stabilization has been more effective.
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by “legitimate” cyclical factors, becomes, in a sense, structural. It is bound to
last until a new positive impulse to growth overcomes the previous
cumulative output loss. True, as we argued above, at each point in time
there is about a 50% chance that this happens. But what is, then, an
“excessive deficit”? And how is it ascertained the return to normality? At the
moment it is unclear whether and how the SGP institutions are ready to
address these crucial questions.
 

Was it by chance that the breakdown of the SGP excessive deficits
procedure occured after three years of stagnation, if not recession, in the
euro area and the quest for reform was led by the two early guardians of the
SGP orthodoxy?
In this paper we have sought to reframe the matter of the role of
fiscal policy in the macroeconomic process in vew of the implementation of
fiscal rules within a consistent macroeconomic model whereby the cyclical
dynamics of GDP, inflation, monetary and fiscal variables are jointly
determined. As an empirical innovation, we have specified the model in
terms of growth gaps, rather than level gaps, consistently with the common
perception and measurement of business cycles as well as with the new
exemption clauses introduced by the reformed SGP. In the paper we have
reported some results of estimation of the model for Italy and Germany, and
of subsequent simulations of a negative growth gap shock. These results
need further refinements and controls. Yet the foregoing findings prompt a
few considerations concerning the implementation of the SGP (revised)
rules.
To beign with, a few measurement problems have emerged and have
been addressed. As also indicated by Melitz (2005), we have seen that broad
measures of public expenditure and taxation do respond to the business
cycle, and hence we cannot but agree with this author that the larger these
items the better. The implication is that not much of observed changes in
fiscal variables can undisputably be subtracted from anti-cyclical
stabilization. In other words, the body of evidence in order to open excessive
deficits procedures may be very limited if excessive should mean beyond
legitimate anti-cyclical deficits. There is also a normative side of this
statistical finding. The Commission’s popular view that the EMU
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governments ought simply “let the automatic stabilizers work”, the more is
viable the larger the extent of anti-cyclical fiscal variables. This cannot but
legitimate the great prudence, if not reluctance, of most governments
towards dismantling public safety nets as is often recommended by the
Commission itself (see also Farina and Tamborini (2004)).
We have also shown that attempts at measuring the cyclical
components of fiscal variables by means of estimated elasticities to some
measure of the business cycle are undermined by several pitfalls. With the
help of simulations, we have obtained what we think the theoretically
correct measure of these elasticities, the steady-state rates of deviations in
absolute fiscal measures in response to intial GDP growth gap (last column
table 2). True, this measure can hardly be obtained in practice; yet
researchers should be aware that measures obtained on observable data,
which probably contain at least part of the stabilization effect of fiscal
variables on GDP, tend to overestimate the magnitude of elasticities
(especially if measured as GDP ratios), the more so the more effective are
fiscal variables.
It is once again confirmed that the long-standing scepticisms and
criticisms about the choice of the total deficit/GDP ratio as the pillar of the
SGP rules are not groundless. Beside the aforementioned measurement
problems, our simluations have highlighted how the sensitivity of such an
indicator to the business cycle and to monetary policy may seriously mislead
the assessment of the actual fiscal stance of a government. The use of this
indicator seems at variance with the prescription in the recent
developments of the theory of policy rules according to which rules should
make refernce to, and policy-makers should be assessed on, instruments
that they can control, not outcomes they do not control (Woodford (2003, ch.
1)).  On the other hand, the imposition of a fixed and equal ceiling for all
countries is likely to interfere with sound stabilization policy.
The shift of focus towards growth gaps also in the new exemption
clauses of the SGP implies far reaching modifications in the assessment of
fiscal stances of member countries, and in the ensuing policy prescriptions.
The relative frequency of negative strings of growth gaps, combined with the
responsiveness of large fiscal aggregates to these gaps, shed doubts on the
view that the 3% deficit ceiling allows sufficient saftey margin for cyclical
manouvre. What is more important, we have shown that these episodes,
even though triggered by temporary shocks, determine permanent output
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losses to which there correspond permanent primary deficits. These will not
be reabsorbed by mere return to “normal” growth. Hence it is not clear how
the Commission will assess these situations.
Corrections and exemptions progressively introduced in the SGP have
pointed to the right directions, but have not been, and will not be, effective
means to solve these problems. Overall, our judgement is that the revised
SGP neither has fixed its fundamental flaw − the misuse of a cyclical
variable like the deficit/GDP ratio to gauge "excessive deficits" that should
instead be assassed against the long-run sustainability of public debt
growth − nor has introduced effective safeguards for the stabilization role of
fiscal policy. Making the application of a "stupid" rule more "flexible" will
not transform it in an intelligent rule but in an empty rule.
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